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1 Overview of the Judgments1
1.1 On the Validity of the new nec Directive
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 13 March 2019 in Case C/128/17 – 
Poland v Parliament and Council
1.1.1 Subject Matter
This case concerns an action for annulment against Directive (EU) 2016/2284, 
the New nec Directive, brought by Poland and supported by Hungary and 
Romania. Poland alleged the infringement of several procedural and material 
norms by the establishing of the Directive. In particular Poland alleged the 
infringement of the duty to carry out a proper impact assessment and of the 
principle of sincere cooperation. It also alleged breach of the principles of pro-
portionality and equal treatment. All plea were disbanded by the Court.
1.1.2 Key Findings
41 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Republic of Poland 
is not entitled to claim that the data taken into account by the EU legislature 
in order to adopt the contested directive were incomplete as regards the indi-
vidual situation of the Republic of Poland, since those data were compiled by 
iiasa jointly with representatives of that Member State and, in particular, on 
1 Only opinions, judgements and orders available on Curia.eu under the subject matter 
‘environment’ and ‘provisions concerning the institutions/access to documents’ have been 
included in this report. Due to the length constrains, only those proceedings that in the sub-
jective opinion of the editor were considered interesting are included.
Downloaded from Brill.com02/18/2020 02:40:12PM
via Universiteit of Groningen
Squintani
journal for european environmental & planning law 16 (2019) 407-425
<UN>
408
the basis of data supplied by the latter. Moreover, as is apparent from Council 
Document No 11265/16 of 14 July 2016 (pages 66 and 67), the Republic of Poland 
did not forward all of the required information in respect of some of the pol-
lutants covered by the contested directive.
42 For the same reasons and, in particular, since the EU legislature also re-
lied on other information at its disposal, the Republic of Poland’s argument 
that the impact assessment was vague, insufficient and overly general cannot 
succeed.
74 The duty of sincere cooperation cannot have a wider scope, in the sense 
of requiring the EU legislature, in all circumstances, to produce, at the request 
of a Member State, documents and information that are allegedly missing or 
to correct information available to it before being able to adopt an act. Such an 
interpretation could prevent the institutions from exercising their discretion 
and block the legislative process.
75 It is, admittedly, true that the duty of sincere cooperation includes the ob-
ligation of mutual assistance, which entails, among other things, the exchange 
of relevant information between the institutions and the Member States dur-
ing the legislative process. However, that obligation cannot provide a means 
for one of those States, in the event of disagreement as to the adequacy, rel-
evance or accuracy of the available data, to challenge the lawfulness of the 
decision-making process on that ground alone.
1.2 On the Concept of Waste
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 14 March 2019 in Case C-399/17 – 
Commission v Czech Republic
1.2.1 Subject Matter
This infringement procedure against Czech Republic concerns this Member 
State failure to comply with Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 on the shipment of 
waste (the Basel Regulation) when it refused to take-back to Czech Republic 
the shipment to Poland of Geobal which was deposited in Katowice (Poland) 
allegedly in breach of the Regulation. As the Basel Regulation only applies to 
the shipment of waste, it was first necessary to establish whether Geobal con-
stitutes waste.
1.2.2 Key Findings
63 That point was confirmed, at the hearing before the Court, by the Czech 
Republic, which also acknowledged that the tar acid – the principal component 
of the mixture – was derived from former oil-refining activities on the Ostra-
va site and corresponds to ‘waste tarry residues (excluding asphalt cements) 
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arising from refining, distillation and any pyrolitic treatment of  organic mate-
rials’ in entry A3190 in List A in Part 1 of Annex V to Regulation No 1013/2006. 
Nevertheless, that Member State submits that, by mixing it with carbon dust 
and calcium oxide to form tps-nolo (Geobal), that tar underwent a transfor-
mation which meant it ceased to be waste and was capable of being used as 
fuel in cement works.
73 It should be borne in mind, in that regard, that according to Article 2(2) of 
that regulation waste is not a substance, a mixture or article within the mean-
ing of Article 3 of the regulation. It is true that, as the Commission submits, the 
mixture at issue may have been wrongly registered under the reach Regula-
tion in disregard of its classification as waste. However, such a hypothesis can-
not be taken to demonstrate that the mixture is waste. While not permitting 
a definitive conclusion to the contrary, the registration of a substance under 
the reach Regulation is, nevertheless, relevant for the purpose of determin-
ing whether that substance has ceased to be waste (see, to that effect, judg-
ment of 7 March 2013, Lapin ely-keskus, liikenne ja infrastruktuuri, C-358/11, 
EU:C:2013:142, paragraphs 63 and 64).
78 It follows from all the foregoing that the Commission cannot be consid-
ered to have proven to the requisite legal standard that the mixture at issue 
was waste within the meaning of Directive 2006/12. As a result, it has failed to 
establish that the shipment of that mixture from the Czech Republic to Poland 
in late 2010 or early 2011 constituted, at the time it took place, a shipment of 
waste within the meaning of Regulation No 1013/2006 and, as a result, that the 
Czech Republic failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 24(2) in conjunction 
with Article 28(1) of that Regulation. The Commission’s action must therefore 
be dismissed.
1.3 On the Duty to have a Permit for Operating Landfills
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 21 March 2019 in Case C-498/17 – 
Commission v Italy
1.3.1 Subject Matter
This case concerns an infringement proceeding against Italy for breach of Di-
rective 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste (the Landfill Directive). Under the 
Directive, landfills which have been granted a permit or which were in opera-
tion before 16 July 2001 may not continue to operate after 16 July 2009 unless 
they obtained a permit in compliance with the Directive. Several Italian land-
fills did not comply with this obligation according to the Commission. The 
Court of Justice agrees with the Commission and condemns Italy for breach 
of the Directive.
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Declares that, by having failed to adopt, with regard to the landfill sites of Avi-
gliano (area of Serre Le Brecce), Ferrandina (area of Venita), Genzano di Luca-
nia (area of Matinella), Latronico (area of Torre), Lauria (area of Carpineto), 
Maratea (area of Montescuro), Moliterno (area of Tempa La Guarella), both 
landfill sites of Potenza (area of Montegrosso-Pallareta), the landfill sites of 
Rapolla (area of Albero in Piano), Roccanova (area of Serre), Sant’Angelo Le 
Fratte (area of Farisi), Campotosto (area of Reperduso), Capistrello (area of 
Trasolero), Francavilla (Valle Anzuca), L’Aquila (area of Ponte delle Grotte), 
Andria (D’Oria G. & C. Snc), Canosa (CO.BE.MA), Bisceglie (CO.GE.ser), 
Andria (F.lli Acquaviva), Trani (bat-Igea Srl), Torviscosa (Caffaro (undertak-
ing)), Atella (area of Cafaro), Corleto Perticara (area of Tempa Masone), Mar-
sico Nuovo (area of Galaino), Matera (area of La Martella), Pescopagano (area 
of Domacchia), Rionero in Volture (area of Ventaruolo), Salandra (area of 
Piano del Governo), San Mauro Forte (area of Priati), Senise (area of Palom-
abara), Tito (area of Aia dei Monaci), Tito (area of Valle del Forno), Capestrano 
(area of Tirassegno), Castellalto (area of Colle Coccu), Castelvecchio Calvisio 
(area of Termine), Corfinio (area of Cannucce), Corfinio (area of Case quer-
ceto), Mosciano S. Angelo (area of Santa Assunta), S. Omero (area of Ficca-
denti), Montecorvino Pugliano (area of Parapoti), San Bartolomeo in Galdo 
(area of Serra Pastore), Trivigano (formerly Cava Zof) and Torviscosa (area of 
La Valletta), all the measures necessary in order that, as soon as possible, in 
accordance with Article 7(g) and Article 13 of Council Directive 1999/31/EC 
of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste, those landfill sites in the above list 
which have not obtained, in accordance with Article 8 of that directive, a 
permit to continue to operate, may be closed, or by failing to adopt the mea-
sures necessary to bring those landfill sites which have obtained a permit to 
 continue to operate into line with that directive, without prejudice to the 
conditions laid down in  Annex I, point 1, to that directive, the Italian Repub-
lic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 14(b) and (c) of Directive 
1999/31
1.4 On the Classification of a Substance as Waste or Hazardous Waste 
under the New Waste Directive
Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 28 March 2019 in Joined Cases 
C-487/17 to C-489/17 – Verlezza and Others
1.4.1 Subject Matter
These requests for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of Article 
4(2) of and Annex iii to Directive 2008/98/EC on waste (the New Waste 
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 Directive) and Decision 2000/532/EC establishing a list of waste. The requests 
were made in criminal proceedings brought against Mr Alfonso Verlezza, and 
other natural and legal persons for offences concerning, inter alia, illegal waste 
trafficking. The waste in question is considered ‘mirror’ waste, thus waste that 
can be classified as ‘waste’ or as ‘hazardous waste’ under Annex iii of the New 
Waste Directive and the Annex to Decisions 2000/532/EC. The Supreme Court 
of Cassation, Italy had doubts about how to classify the waste at hand in the 
proceedings and as to whether the precautionary principle dictates a specific 
choice between these two regimes in case of uncertainty. Accordingly, it asked 
for a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice.
1.4.2 Key Findings
40 Therefore, where the composition of waste to which mirror codes may 
be assigned is not immediately known, it falls to the holder of that waste, as 
the party responsible for its management, to gather information which may 
enable it to gain sufficient knowledge of that composition and, thus, assign the 
appropriate code to that waste.
62 In view of those considerations, the answer to the fourth question is that 
the precautionary principle must be interpreted to the effect that where, fol-
lowing an assessment of the risks, which is as complete as possible having re-
gard to the particular circumstances of the case, it is impossible, in practical 
terms, for a holder of waste which may be classified under mirror codes to 
determine the presence of hazardous substances or to assess the hazardous 
property of that waste, it must be classified as hazardous waste.
1.5 On the Criteria for the End-of-Waste Status under the 
New Waste Directive
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 March 2019 in Case C-60/18 – 
Tallinna Vesi
1.5.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 6(4) 
of the New Waste Directive. The request has been made in the proceedings be-
tween Tallinna Vesi AS and Keskkonnaamet (Environmental Board, Estonia), 
concerning the adoption of two notices by the latter which were issued to Tal-
linna Vesi in relation to the recovery of waste and which refused to recognise 
end-of-waste status for sewage sludge that had undergone recovery treatment. 
Under Estonian law, where criteria have not been set at EU level for determin-
ing end-of-waste status as regards a specific type of waste, such end status de-
pends on the existence of criteria laid down in a generally applicable  national 
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legal act concerning that type of waste. As nor EU law, nor national law estab-
lish such criteria for sewage sludge that has undergone recovery treatment, 
Tallinna Vesi’s requests was refuted. The Court of Appeal, Tallinn, Estonia, 
asked, in essence, whether this is allowed under the Directive and whether Tal-
linna Vesi may demand the recognition of the end-of-waste status by Estonia.
1.5.2 Key Findings
25 Article 6(4) of Directive 2008/98 does not, therefore, preclude national 
legislation under which, where no criteria are laid down at EU level for deter-
mining end-of-waste status as regards a specific type of waste, the end of that 
status of waste depends on the existence of criteria laid down in a generally 
applicable national legal act concerning that type of waste.
30 Consequently, it must be held that Article 6(4) of Directive 2008/98 does 
not allow a waste holder, such as Tallinna Vesi, to demand, in circumstances 
such as those in the main proceedings, the recognition of end-of-waste status 
by the competent authority of the Member State or by a court of that Member 
State.
1.6 On the Relationship between EU Law and Investment Law
Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 30 April 2019 in Opinion 1/17 – EU-Canada 
cet Agreement
1.6.1 Subject Matter
This opinion concerns the agreement signed in Brussels on 30 October 2016 
between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member 
States, of the other part, about a ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment’, better known by the acronym ‘ceta’. In its request for an opinion, the 
Kingdom of Belgium makes known to the Court its doubts as to whether Sec-
tion F of Chapter 8 of the ceta is compatible with the Treaties. The purpose of 
Section F of Chapter 8 of the ceta is to establish a mechanism for the resolu-
tion of disputes between investors and States, also known as the Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement system (isds). To that end, that section provides for the 
establishment of a Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’ or ‘the ceta Tribunal’) and an Ap-
pellate Tribunal (‘the Appellate Tribunal’ or the ‘the ceta Appellate Tribunal’) 
as well as, in the longer term, a multilateral investment tribunal and appel-
late mechanism which would bring to an end the functioning of the initial 
tribunals. ceta thus provides for an institutionalised procedural framework 
with the aim of settling any disputes between an investor of one Party and the 
other Party concerning the interpretation and application of the ceta, which 
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is  intended to remedy the shortcomings ascribed to the classical isds system. 
An important aspect of the case concerned the relationship between ceta 
and EU law from the perspective of the EU autonomy principle.
1.6.2 Key Findings
119 Consequently, in order to determine the compatibility of the envisaged 
isds mechanism with the autonomy of the EU legal order, it is necessary to be 
satisfied that:
– Section F of Chapter Eight of the ceta does not confer on the envisaged 
tribunals any power to interpret or apply EU law other than the power to 
interpret and apply the provisions of that agreement having regard to the 
rules and principles of international law applicable between the Parties, 
and
– Section F of Chapter Eight of the ceta does not structure the powers of 
those tribunals in such a way that, while not themselves engaging in the 
interpretation or application of rules of EU law other than those of that 
agreement, they may issue awards which have the effect of preventing the 
EU institutions from operating in accordance with the EU constitutional 
framework.
134 Since the ceta Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal stand outside the EU 
judicial system and since their powers of interpretation are confined to the 
provisions of the ceta in the light of the rules and principles of international 
law applicable between the Parties, it is, moreover, consistent that the ceta 
makes no provision for the prior involvement of the Court that would permit 
or oblige that Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal to make a reference for a prelimi-
nary ruling to the Court.
135 For the same reasons, it is, moreover, consistent that the ceta confers 
on those Tribunals the power to give a definitive ruling on a dispute brought 
by an investor against the investment host State or against the Union, without 
establishing any procedure for the re-examination of the award by a court of 
that State or by the Court and without that investor being permitted – subject 
to the specific exceptions listed in Article 8.22.5 of the ceta – to bring, during 
or on the conclusion of the procedure before those Tribunals, the same dispute 
before a court of that State or before the Court.
136 It follows from the foregoing that Section F of Chapter Eight of the ceta 
does not confer on the envisaged tribunals any jurisdiction to interpret or ap-
ply EU law other than that relating to the provisions of that agreement.
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245 It follows from all the foregoing that Section F of Chapter Eight of the 
ceta is compatible with EU primary law.
1.7 On the Right to Access to Justice in Environmental Matters at EU Level
Order of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 8 May 2019 in Case T-330/ 
18 – Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council
1.7.1 Subject Matter
The proceeding concerns an action for annulment brought by private par-
ties before the General Court. The applicants, Mr Armando Carvalho and the 
other natural and legal persons seek the annulment in part of Directive (EU) 
2018/410 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission 
reductions and low-carbon investments, Regulation (EU) 2018/842 on binding 
annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 
2030 contributing, and Regulation (EU) 2018/841 on the inclusion of green-
house gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry 
in the 2030 climate and energy framework. Moreover, they seek compensation 
under Articles 268 and 340 tfeu in the form of an injunction for the damage 
that the applicants claim to have suffered.
1.7.2 Key Findings
47 Such an argument cannot succeed.
48 It is apparent from the case-law that, although it is true that, when adopt-
ing an act of general application, the institutions of the Union are required to 
respect higher-ranking rules of law, including fundamental rights, the claim 
that such an act infringes those rules or rights is not sufficient in itself to 
establish that the action brought by an individual is admissible, without run-
ning the risk of rendering the requirements of the fourth paragraph of Article 
263 tfeu meaningless, as long as that alleged infringement does not distin-
guish the applicant individually just as in the case of the addressee (see judg-
ment of 2 March 2010, Arcelor v Parliament and Council, T-16/04, EU:T:2010:54, 
paragraph 103 and the case-law cited).
49 The applicants have not established that the contested provisions of the 
legislative package infringed their fundamental rights and distinguished them 
individually from all other natural or legal persons concerned by those provi-
sions just as in the case of the addressee.
66 That principle is limited by the prohibition on abuse of the proceedings. 
An applicant may not, by means of an action for damages, attempt to obtain a 
result similar to the result of annulling the act, where an action for annulment 
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concerning that act would be inadmissible (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 
December 1966, Schreckenberg v Commission, 59/65, EU:C:1966:60, p. 797).
1.8 On Compliance with the ‘Waste of Hierarchy’ Principle and 
the sea Directive
Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 8 May 2019 in Case C-305/18 – “Verdi 
Ambiente e Società – Aps Onulu” and Others
1.8.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Directive 
2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes 
on the environment (the sea Directive) and the New Waste Directive. The re-
quest has been made in the context of proceedings between, on the one hand, 
the environmental protection organisations Verdi Ambiente e Società (vas) 
and Others and, on the other hand, the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 
(Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Italy) and Others concerning an action 
seeking the annulment of a decree of the President of the Council of Ministers 
on the identification of the overall treatment capacity of facilities for the incin-
eration of municipal and similar waste. The Regional Administrative Court of 
Lazio, Italy, asked to the Court of Justice, in essence, whether the ‘waste hier-
archy’ principle must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as 
that at issue in the main proceedings, which classifies waste incineration facili-
ties as ‘strategic infrastructure and installations of major national importance’. 
Moreover, it asked whether the sea Directive must be interpreted as meaning 
that national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, com-
prising basic legislation and implementing legislation, which revises upwards 
the capacity of existing waste incineration facilities and which provides for 
the construction of new installations of that kind, comes under the notion of 
‘plans and programmes’, within the meaning of that directive, and which must, 
consequently, be subject to a prior environmental assessment.
1.8.2 Key Findings
31 Moreover, according to Article 13 of the ‘Waste’ Directive, Member States 
take the necessary measures to ensure that waste management is carried out 
without endangering human health and without harming the environment, in 
particular without risk to water, air, soil, plants or animals.
33 In the present case, the fact that national legislation, such as that at is-
sue in the main proceedings, classifies waste incineration facilities as ‘strategic 
infrastructure and installations of major national importance’ does not mean 
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that the national legislature intended to disregard the instructions stemming 
from the ‘waste hierarchy’ principle, as provided for in the ‘Waste’ Directive.
60 It follows that the answer to the third question is that Article 2(a), Article 
3(1), and Article 3(2)(a) of the sea Directive must be interpreted as meaning 
that national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, com-
prising basic legislation and implementing legislation, which revises upwards 
the capacity of existing waste incineration facilities and which provides for 
the construction of new installations of that kind, comes under the notion of 
‘plans and programmes’, within the meaning of that directive, where it is likely 
to have significant environmental effects and must, consequently, be subject to 
a prior environmental assessment.
1.9 On the Concept of Waste Exempted from the Basel Regulation 
Requirements I
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 16 May 2019 in Case C-689/17 – Conti 
11. Container Schiffahrt
1.9.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1(3)
(b) of Basel Regulation. The request has been made in proceedings between 
‘Conti 11. Container Schiffahrts-GmbH & Co. KG Ms ‘msc Flaminia’ (‘Conti’) 
and Land Niedersachsen (the Land of Lower Saxony, Germany) concerning the 
obligation imposed by the latter on Conti to carry out a notification procedure 
relating to shipment of waste that was on board the ship msc Flaminia (‘the 
Flaminia’) following damage at sea. The Regional Court of Munich I, Germany, 
asked to the Court of Justice, in essence, whether residues in the form of scrap 
metal and of fire-extinguishing water mixed with sludge and cargo residues, 
such as those at issue in the main proceedings, attributable to damage occur-
ring on board a ship at sea, must be regarded as waste generated on board 
ships, within the meaning of the Regulation.
1.9.2 Key Findings
53 It follows from the foregoing considerations that Article 1(3)(b) of Regula-
tion No 1013/2006 must be interpreted as meaning that residues, in the form 
of scrap metal and of fire-extinguishing water mixed with sludge and cargo 
residues, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, attributable to dam-
age occurring on board a ship at sea, must be regarded as waste generated on 
board ships, within the meaning of that provision, which is, therefore, exclud-
ed from that regulation’s scope until it is offloaded in order to be recovered or 
disposed of.
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1.10 On the Concept of Waste Exempted from the Basel Regulation 
Requirements ii
Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 23 May 2019 in Case C-634/ 
17 – ReFood
1.10.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 
1(3)(d) of the Basel Regulation. The request has been made in proceedings be-
tween ReFood GmbH & Co. KG (‘ReFood’) and the Landwirtschaftskammer 
Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony Chamber of Agriculture, Germany) concerning 
the legality of a transfer of animal by-products from the Netherlands to Ger-
many. The Administrative Court of Oldenburg, Germany, asked to the Court 
of Justice, in essence, whether all shipments of animal by-products covered 
by Regulation No 1069/2009 laying down health rules concerning animal by-
products not intended for human consumption or only certain of those ship-
ments, which satisfy specific conditions imposed by Regulation No 1069/2009, 
are excluded from the scope of the Basel Regulation, under Article 1(3)(d) of 
that regulation.
1.10.2 Key Findings
51 Thus, as regards the transport of category 3 animal by-products from one 
Member State to another, in addition to the general obligations concerning the 
traceability of animal by-products and the registration of operators provided 
for in Articles 22 and 23, Regulation No 1069/2009 is, in essence, limited to 
providing, in Article 21(2), that operators shall ensure that a commercial docu-
ment or, in certain cases, a health certificate accompanies such by-products 
during their transport. It adds, in Article 21(4), that operators shall carry out 
the transport of category 3 culinary waste in accordance with the national 
measures provided for in Article 13 of Directive 2008/98, which provides that 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that waste man-
agement is carried out without endangering human health and harming the 
environment.
52 In contrast, as regards category 1 or 2 materials and certain products de-
rived from those materials, Article 48(1) of Regulation No 1069/2009 provides 
that the dispatch from one Member State to another is subject to consent by 
competent authority of the Member State of destination.
62 Having regard to all of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the 
questions referred is that Article 1(3)(d) of Regulation No 1013/2006 must be in-
terpreted as meaning that shipments of animal by-products falling within Reg-
ulation No 1069/2009 are excluded from the scope of Regulation No 1013/2006, 
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except in cases where Regulation No 1069/2009 expressly provides for the ap-
plication of Regulation No 1013/2006.
1.11 On the Relationship between the Habitats Directive and the sea 
Directive I
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 12 June 2019 in Case C-321/18 – Terre 
wallonne
1.11.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 3(2) 
and (4) of the sea Directive. The request was made in the course of proceed-
ings between Terre Wallonne asbl and Région wallonne (Walloon Region, 
Belgium) concerning the validity of the Walloon Government’s Decree of 1 De-
cember 2016 setting conservation objectives for the Natura 2000 network. The 
Council of State, Belgium, asked to the Court of Justice, in essence, whether 
Article 3(2) and (4) of the sea Directive must be interpreted as meaning that 
a decree, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by which a body of a 
Member State establishes conservation objectives at regional level for its Na-
tura 2000 network, is one of the ‘plans and programmes’ for which an environ-
mental impact assessment is mandatory.
1.11.2 Key Findings
42 In the present case, the Decree of 1 December 2016 does not set out con-
servation objectives for specific sites, but summarises them for the Walloon 
region as a whole. Furthermore, it is apparent from the third subparagraph of 
Article 25a(1) of the Law of 12 July 1973 that the conservation objectives at Wal-
loon Region level have indicative value only, whereas the second subparagraph 
of Article 25a(2) provides that the conservation objectives applicable at the 
level of Natura 2000 sites have statutory value.
43 In the light of those factors, it must be held that a measure, such as that 
at issue in the main proceedings, fails to satisfy the condition recalled in para-
graph 41 of the present judgment, in that it does not set a framework for future 
development consent of projects, with the effect that it does not come within 
the scope either of Article 3(2)(a) or Article 3(4) of the sea Directive.
44 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the questions referred is that 
Article 3(2) and (4) of the sea Directive must be interpreted as meaning that 
a decree, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by which a body of a 
Member State establishes, at regional level for its Natura 2000 network, con-
servation objectives which have an indicative value, whereas the conservation 
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objectives at site level have a statutory value, is not one of the ‘plans and pro-
grammes’, within the meaning of that directive, for which an environmental 
impact assessment is mandatory.
1.12 On the Relationship between the Habitats Directive and the sea 
Directive ii
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 12 June 2019 in Case C-43/18 – 
Compagnie d’entreprises cfe
1.12.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 
3(2), (4) and (5) of the sea Directive. The request has been made in pro-
ceedings between Compagnie d’entreprises cfe SA (‘cfe’) and Région de 
 Bruxelles-Capitale (Brussels-Capital Region, Belgium), concerning the validity 
of the decree of 14 April 2016 of the Government of that region designating Na-
tura 2000 site BE1000001 ‘La Forêt de Soignes avec lisières et domaines boisés 
avoisinants et la Vallée de la Woluwe’ (‘The Sonian forest together with forest 
margins and surrounding wooded areas and the Woluwe valley’). The Council 
of State, Belgium, asked to the Court of Justice, in essence, whether Article 3(2) 
and (4) of the sea Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that a decree such 
as that at issue in the main proceedings, whereby a Member State designates 
a Special Area of Conservation and makes provisions as to conservation objec-
tives and certain preventive measures, is one of the ‘plans and programmes’ in 
respect of which an environmental impact assessment is required.
1.12.2 Judgment
Article 3(2) and (4) of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans 
and programmes on the environment is to be interpreted, subject to those 
matters which are for the referring court to verify, as meaning that a decree 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings, whereby a Member State desig-
nates an sac, and makes provision as to conservation objectives and certain 
preventive measures, is not among the ‘plans and programmes’ in respect of 
which an environmental impact assessment is required.
1.13 On the Free Allocation of Allowances and the Concept of Electricity 
Generator under the ets Directive Framework
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 20 June 2019 in Case C-682/17 – 
ExxonMobil Production Deutschland
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This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 3(u) 
and Article 10a of, and Annex I to, Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme 
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading (the ets Directive), and of Ar-
ticle 3(c) and (h) of Commission Decision 2011/278/EU determining transition-
al Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances. 
The request has been made in proceedings between ExxonMobil Production 
Deutschland GmbH (‘ExxonMobil’) and Bundesrepublik Deutschland (the 
Federal Republic of Germany) concerning an application for the allocation of 
greenhouse gas emission allowances (‘emission allowances’) free of charge to a 
natural gas processing installation which carries out, inter alia, sulphur recov-
ery, in the course of which, by combustion of fuels, it generates electricity and 
heat, releasing carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere. The Administrative 
Court of Berline, Germany, asked to the Court of Justice, in essence, wheth-
er and, if so, to what extent, an installation, such as the installation at issue, 
which engages in natural gas desulphurisation and sulphur  recovery under the 
Claus process, is entitled to be allocated emission allowances free of charge 
for the CO2 emitted in the course of those activities in respect of the trading 
period running from 2013 to 2020.
1.13.2 Key Findings
92 As follows from paragraph 58 of the present judgment, an installation 
such as the installation at issue in the main proceedings falls within the scope 
of Directive 2003/87 only in respect of the CO2 emissions resulting from such 
an activity of combustion of fuels. Therefore, it is subject to the emission al-
lowance trading scheme only in respect of that activity, to the exclusion of 
other activities not falling within Annex I to the directive. On the other hand, 
an installation carrying out simultaneously an activity of combustion of fuels 
and one or more other activities referred to in Annex I is subject to that trading 
scheme in respect of all of its activities that produce CO2 emissions. Accord-
ingly, even though those two types of installation produce electricity, an instal-
lation of the second type, which falls within the trading scheme in respect of 
all its CO2 emissions resulting from such activities, is entitled to obtain free 
allowances in respect of those emissions, unlike an installation of the first type 
which, since it is subject to the trading scheme only in respect of its CO2 emis-
sions resulting from the activity of combustion of fuels, does not qualify for 
such allowances.
96 Consequently, the answer to the first question is that Article 3(u) of Direc-
tive 2003/87 must be interpreted as meaning that an installation, such as that 
Downloaded from Brill.com02/18/2020 02:40:12PM
via Universiteit of Groningen
 421Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
journal for european environmental & planning law 16 (2019) 407-425
<UN>
at issue in the main proceedings, which produces, within the framework of its 
activity of ‘combustion of fuels in installations with a total rated thermal input 
exceeding 20 MW’, referred to in Annex I to that directive, electricity intended 
essentially to be used for its own needs, must be regarded as an ‘electricity 
generator’, within the meaning of that provision, where that installation, first, 
carries out simultaneously an activity for producing a product which does not 
fall within that annex and, second, continuously feeds, for consideration, even 
a small part of the electricity produced into the public electricity network, to 
which that installation must be permanently connected for technical reasons.
124 It follows from all the foregoing that, where an installation such as that 
in the main proceedings must be regarded as an ‘electricity generator’, within 
the meaning of Article 3(u) of Directive 2003/87, it cannot be allocated free 
emission allowances under Article 10a of that directive and the provisions of 
Decision 2011/278.
1.14 On the Assessment of Ambient Air Quality under the Air Quality 
Directive
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 June 2019 in Case C-723/17 – 
Craeynest and Others
1.14.1 Subject Matter
This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of, most im-
portantly, Article 4(3) teu and Articles 6, 7, 13 and 23 of and Annexes iii and 
xi to Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe 
(the Air Quality Directive). The request has been made in the context of a dis-
pute between Ms Lies Craeynest and other, on the one hand, and the Brussels 
Hoofdstedelijk Gewest (Brussels Capital Region, Belgium) and the Brussels In-
stituut voor Milieubeheer (Brussels Institute for Environmental Management, 
Belgium), on the other, regarding the obligation to develop an air quality plan 
for the Brussels zone (Belgium) and to install the sampling points legally re-
quired to monitor air quality. Most importantly, the Dutch-language Court 
of First Instance, Brussels, Belgium, asked to the Court of Justice, in essence, 
whether Article 13(1) and Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50 must be interpreted 
as meaning that, in order to establish whether a limit value with an averaging 
period of one calendar year, as laid down in Annex xi to that Directive, has 
been exceeded, it is sufficient that a pollution level higher than that value be 
measured at a single sampling point or whether it is necessary that the average 
of the measurements taken at all the sampling points in a particular zone or 
agglomeration indicate such a pollution level.
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56 In view of all the above considerations, the answer to the first question is 
that Article 4(3) teu and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) teu, read 
in conjunction with the third paragraph of Article 288 tfeu, and Articles 6 
and 7 of Directive 2008/50 must be interpreted as meaning that it is for a na-
tional court, hearing an application submitted for that purpose by individuals 
directly affected by the exceedance of the limit values referred to in Article 
13(1) of that directive, to verify whether the sampling points located in a par-
ticular zone have been established in accordance with the criteria laid down in 
paragraph 1(a) of Section B of Annex iii to the directive and, if they were not, 
to take all necessary measures in respect of the competent national authority, 
such as, if provided for by national law, an order, with a view to ensuring that 
those sampling points are sited in accordance with those criteria.
59 As the Advocate General noted in points 72 to 75 of her Opinion, the 
wording of Article 13(1) of Directive 2008/50 does not make it possible to an-
swer the second question raised by the referring court. The same applies as 
regards Article 23(1) of that directive.
60 When a literal interpretation of a provision of EU law does not permit 
its precise scope to be assessed, it must be interpreted by reference to the gen-
eral scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 
6 June 2018, Koppers Denmark, C-49/17, EU:C:2018:395, paragraph 22 and the 
case-law cited).
61 It follows from Article 6(1) and the third subparagraph of Article 13(1) of 
Directive 2008/50 that it is for the Member States to assess compliance with 
the limit values in accordance with the requirements and criteria set out in 
Annex iii to that directive. As is apparent from paragraph 1 of Section A of that 
annex, Sections B and C of that annex concern the location of sampling points, 
but also provide guidance for the implementation of the other air quality as-
sessment methods provided for in Directive 2008/50.
62 In this respect, it was observed, in paragraph 39 above, that the provi-
sions of paragraph 1(a) and (f) of Section B of Annex iii to Directive 2008/50 
require sampling points to provide representative data for locations in a zone 
or agglomeration characterised by a certain level of pollution. The system thus 
designed by the EU legislature seeks to enable the competent authorities not 
only to know the level of air pollution at the location represented by a sam-
pling point, but also to infer from this the level of pollution at other similar lo-
cations. As is apparent from recital 14 of Directive 2008/50, the latter objective 
is achieved, inter alia, by using modelling techniques.
63 It follows that the determination of the average of the values measured 
at all sampling points in a zone or agglomeration does not provide a valid 
Downloaded from Brill.com02/18/2020 02:40:12PM
via Universiteit of Groningen
 423Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
journal for european environmental & planning law 16 (2019) 407-425
<UN>
indication as to the population’s exposure to pollutants. In particular, such an 
average does not make it possible to determine the level of exposure of the 
population in general, since that level must be assessed using sampling points 
set up specifically for that purpose, in accordance with the second indent of 
paragraph 1(a) of Section B of Annex iii to Directive 2008/50.
68 In view of all the above considerations, the answer to the second question 
is that Article 13(1) and Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50 must be interpreted 
as meaning that, in order to establish whether a limit value with an averaging 
period of one calendar year, as laid down in Annex xi to that directive, has 
been exceeded, it is sufficient that a pollution level higher than that value be 
measured at a single sampling point.
2 Editor’s Appraisal of the Reported Case Law
The reported period was a relatively long one. Within the limited space 
available for this appraisal, I will highlight two main elements emerging from 
the reported case law, both of which place questions on the ability of EU 
environmental law to move forward on key issues: a) the uncertainty about the 
concept of waste, and b) the reluctance of the Court of Justice to loosen-up its 
control on EU law.
The readers of this appraisal surely noticed the many cases about waste 
management reported here. Despite the abundant case law and literature 
existing on this topic, including in this journal,2 undertakings, national au-
thorities and even the European Commission still do not know precisely when 
something is waste or not, at least not in all cases. Besides when something 
clearly is waste, they still do not always know what kind of waste it is. The Com-
mission v Czech Republic case (C-399/17) about the classification of Geobal, is 
emblematic in this regard. Most of the Commission’s arguments to establish 
whether Geobal is waste or not were rejected by the Court of Justice. What 
the proceedings bring forward is not only the uncertainty about whether the 
2 Most notably, T. Turunen, Deconstructing the Bottlenecks Caused by Waste Legislation: End-
of-Waste Regulation, jeepl (2017) 14(2):186–207; N. de Sadeleer, Scrap Metal Intended for 
Metal Production: The Thin Line between Waste and Products, jeepl (2012) 9(2), pp. 136–163, 
at p. 140; I. Cheyne, Taming the Precautionary Principle in EC Law: Lessons from Waste and 
gmo Regulation, jeepl (2007) 4(6), pp. 468–483, at pp. 471–472; M. Reese & H-J Koch, Revis-
ing the Waste Framework Directive Basic Deficiencies of European Waste Law and Proposals 
for Reform, jeepl (2005) 6(2): 441–457; N. de Sadeleer, EC Waste Law or How to Juggle with 
Legal Concepts, jeepl (2005) 6(2): 458–477; and N. de Sadeleer, New Perspectives on the 
Definition of Waste in EC Law; jeepl (2005) 2(1): 46–58.
Downloaded from Brill.com02/18/2020 02:40:12PM
via Universiteit of Groningen
Squintani
journal for european environmental & planning law 16 (2019) 407-425
<UN>
424
 findings of an evaluation process on the nature of a product support conclud-
ing whether that product is waste or not. It is the very methodology used in 
this regard that was at times criticised by the Court. This case, when consid-
ered together with those in Conti (C-689/17), ReFood (C-634/17) and Tallinna 
Vesi  (C-60/18), suggests the possible existence of a pattern in which authorities 
prefer to play ‘on the safe side’ and impose the strictest regime possible among 
those available in case of uncertainty. In Conti and ReFood, national authorities 
had opted for the strictest regime available about the shipment of waste and in 
Tallina Vesi for a restrictive regime about the granting of the end-of-waste sta-
tus. It would be interesting to research whether a possible tendency to play on 
the safe side emerging from the reported cases is a mere coincidence or it actu-
ally derives from a preference embedded in the EU waste law system. Verlezza 
and Others (C-489/17) seems to support the latter hypothesis as in this case the 
Court of Justice established that in case of uncertainty about whether a waste 
substance should be considered waste or hazardous waste, the precautionary 
principle dictates that public authorities opt for the most stringent classifica-
tion, the hazardous waste one. This preference is perfectly understandable 
from the perspective of the principles guiding EU environmental law under 
Article 191 tfeu. However, it would be interesting to shade light about the ef-
fects that the circular economy movement – with its interest in bringing waste 
into the production phase – has on the meaning of these principles in the field 
of waste law. Studies on the concepts of ‘waste’, ‘by products’ and ‘end-of-waste’ 
status are thus very welcome.3 A case in this appraisal, Tallina Vesi, shows that 
the Court of Justice is willing to recognise some freedom to the Member States 
about whether to grant, and under which conditions, the end-of-waste status. 
The review of Estonian’s choices in this regard was quite lenient by the Court. 
This suggests that Member States can adopt different regimes, pursuing differ-
ent levels of protection, therefore engaging in green-plating. However, Mem-
ber States do not have carte blanche in this regard.4 In particular, it would be 
interesting to see whether a more stringent approach will be followed in case a 
party relies on the EU free movement provisions. All in all, it can be expected 
that waste law will still be subject of many proceedings aiming at clarifying its 
meaning. Fifty-five years of case law have not been enough.
The other enduring trend highlighted in this appraisal concerns the 
 reluctance of the Court of Justice to loosen-up its control on EU law. Two 
3 See in particular, T. Turunen, The concepts of waste and non-waste in the circular economy, 
University of Eastern Finland. Dissertations (2018).
4 L. Squintani, Beyond Minimum Harmonisation: Gold-Plating and Green-Plating of European 
Environmental Law, Cambridge University Press (2019), in particular, 116–166.
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proceedings in this appraisal confirm this trend. Firstly, Opinion 1/17 about 
the validity of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (isds) system under the 
ceta clears the agreement, but poses severe restrictions on the scope of the 
review that can be performed by the ceta tribunals. In short, as soon as EU 
law is to be discussed in a proceeding, competence is reserved to the Court 
of Justice. It is to be seen how this limitation will affect the functioning of 
the tribunals. Surely, when this opinion is coupled with the Achmea case 
(C-284/16), concerning agreements between Member States rather than 
between Member States and third countries, it is clear that the Court of Justice 
is reluctant torelinquish its control on EU law. This could create frictions 
between EU law and international investment law the consequences of which 
are yet to be seen. An upcoming article of Fermanglia and Mistura in the next 
volume of this journal is therefore a welcome first step in shading light on this 
topic.5
The other proceedings which surely did not escape the attention of the 
reader of this appraisal is the order of the General Court in Carvhalo (T-330/18). 
Inspired by the Urgenda first and second instance judgments,6 this proceed-
ings aims at opening locus standi before the Court of Justice in environmental 
matters. This is a heightened topic which saw the publication of different posi-
tions in this very journal.7 It would be interesting to understand whether the 
choice of handling this case by order rather than by judgment shows a lack of 
willingness from the General Court to give this topic the attention it deserves. 
More interesting, however, is how the Court of Justice will handle the appeal 
case launched in the meanwhile. Surly, the Court has a new opportunity to 
move forward on this topic, which is an achievement in itself for which the 
applicants can be congratulated.
5 For a prior to Achmea and Opinoin 1/17 assessment, see L. Ankersmit, The Compatibility of 
Investment Arbitration in EU Trade Agreements with the eu Judicial System, jeepl (2016) 
13(1): 46–63.
6 Eg. B.W. Wegener, Urgenda – World Rescue by Court Order? The “Climate Justice”-Movement 
Tests the Limits of Legal Protection, jeepl (2019) 16(2): 125–147.
7 Eg. Weener, op. cit.; and Matthijs van Wolferen, Case C-243/15 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie 
vlk v Obvodný úrad Trenčín, jeepl (2017) 14(1): 136–151.
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